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1. Introduction
About two-thirds of the way through the G recension of the Life of Aesop,^ just 
after Aesop has gained his freedom and negotiated a peace agreement between 
Samos and King Croesus of Lydia, there is a curious passage in which we are told 
that the legendary fabulist ‘wrote down (onyypavi/dpevoq) the stories and fables 
that go by his name even now and deposited them in the library (KaxeX,ui£V ei<; xfiv 
PipA,io0fiKnv)’ {Vita G 100)? The image of Aesop writing down his fables in 
Lydia may be the stuff of fiction, but in broaching the seemingly incongruous idea 
of Aesopie authorship, it also draws attention to the reality that Aesop’s fables 
were encountered in antiquity not only as an oral tradition but also as a written 
body of literature. Of course, ancient readers of the Life would have been keenly 
aware of the material nature of the text in their hands. Because the Life circulated 
together with fable collections in our earliest and best manuscripts (e.g.. Vita G), 
it is possible to conceive of the biography as a whole — and, in particular, passages
’ The text I use throughout is Vita G, as edited by Perry 1952, but I have also consulted 
Ferrari 1997 and Papathomopoulos 1990. Vita G is generally held to be our oldest and best 
version of the Life of Aesop, but cf Ferrari 1997, 12-20, for a dissenting view. References 
below to Vita W are also to Perry 1952 (with consultation of Papathomopoulos 1999), 
while references to the so-called ‘Planudean’ version are to Eberhard 1872. The best stud­
ies of the text history of the Life of Aesop are Perry 1933; 1936, 1-70; 1952, 1-4 and 10- 
32. Useful overviews can be found in Ferrari 1997, 41-45; Karla 2001, 10-15; Holzberg 
2002, 72-73; Kurke 2011, 16-17.
2 Aiotonog ouv auxa (Tuyypa\|/dpevo(; tovx; iblom; koyon? kuI puOouq, xoug dxpi Kai vuv 
6vopa^opevou(;, Kaxskutev eii; xfjv PipZioOpicnv {Vita G 100).
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such as this one - as lending a kind of authority to the fables it introduced? Thus 
an ancient reader could feel confident (or, perhaps, take pleasure in the fiction) 
that the product he was holding was an authentic edition of Aesop’s fables, written 
by the fabulist himself before its safe installation in a Lydian bibliotheke.'^
What is of primary interest to me in this paper is the crucial moment at which 
this passage occurs in the Life. Not only has Aesop acquired parrhesia and eleu- 
theria {Vita G 89) in his release from slavery, he has also, for the first time in the 
Life, begun to tell recognizable Aesopic fables. That is, while the Life presents 
Aesop as a skilled manipulator of language and a talented ‘performer of wisdom’ 
in a wide range of circumstances,^ the legendary fabulist does not tell an actual 
fable until after his release from slavery {Vita G 89).® Indeed, all of the known 
fables in the Life of Aesop appear between this scene and the end of the work {Vita 
G 94-142). My aim in this paper is to describe the differences between Aesop’s 
manner of storytelling during and after his enslavement, and to explore some of
^ Holzberg 2002.
'' With two notable exceptions (Finkelpearl 2003 and Holzberg 2002), this passage is usually 
ignored by scholars, and that is understandable: the various reeensions of the Life of Aesop 
differ from one another in many places, and in some ways this is just one of many un- 
historical, preposterous moments in the text. Owing to the difficulties of the text history of 
the Life of Aesop, it is indeed risky to put too much interpretive pressure on any specific 
turn of phrase, especially one that is so blatantly anachronistic, and which, moreover, does 
not occur in the same form in every recension. As it happens, other versions of the Life of 
Aesop do not describe Aesop’s writing and depositing of his fables in precisely the same 
terms, but the idea that Aesop wrote down his fables after gaining his freedom does surface 
in Vita W at roughly the same point in the narrative (cTOTypaijiac; onv xoui; ibfoui; puBonq 
Toug pGXPi vuv cwayivcocncopevoui; KaxeA-iTie xw PaoiXei, ‘Then, writing down the same 
stories known to be his even now, he left them with the king’. Vita W100). In the so-called 
‘Planudean’ Life there is no mention of writing or libraries, but an essential change in Ae­
sop’s status and manner of fable-telling is nonetheless discernible. In addition, the opening 
section of a version of the Life that survives with the fables of Aphthonius (c. 4th century) 
describes Aesop’s fables as deemed ‘worthy of the library’ (fiSKaOn BiBLioOfiicnc); see 
Eberhard, 1872, 306-308.
^ The description of Greek sage figures as ‘performers of wisdom’ in Martin 1998, which I 
discuss in more detail below, is especially useful for characterizing Aesop’s actions in the 
Life of Aesop', cf. also Kurke 2011, 102-106.
^ At Vita G 94, Aesop addresses a fable on the subject of slavery and freedom ^ the story of 
‘The Two Roads’ - to the people of Samos. There has always been significant difference 
of opinion among fable scholars as to what ought to count as a ‘fable’. Perry 1959 is still 
the best overview of the problem (cf. Perry 1952, ix and 1965, xix-xxviii). See also van 
Dijk 1997, 3-73 for a thorough treatment of ancient terminology and parameters of the 
fable. On specific questions regarding the quantity and distribution of fables in the Life of 
Aesop, see especially Perry 1952, 478; Nojgaard 1964, 471; Holzberg 1992, 1996; van 
Dijk 1995; and Jouarmo 2011. For the fable of ‘The Two Roads’, cf Hesiod, Works and 
Days 287-292.
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the ways in which ideas of writing and archiving function to mark the transfor­
mation of Aesop into a fully-developed fabulist.^ While I am primarily interested 
in how changes in the manner and register of Aesop’s storytelling fit into the 
overall structure of the narrative of the Life, 1 will also be approaching the Life as 
a text that is a valuable site for thinking about the fable tradition writ large, its 
status as a literary genre, its orality and textuality, and its relationship to and de­
pendence upon the figure of Aesop.* 
2. Reading Aesopic Performances
To borrow a phrase from the work by Richard Martin on the dynamics of sage 
performances in archaic Greece, we may describe Aesop s actions in the Life as 
‘performances of wisdom’‘Performance’ accommodates both the non-verbal 
and the verbal elements of communication by drawing attention to the roles 
played by actor(s), audience(s), and context in the production of meaning. 
Whether applied to the telling of a famous fable before the people of Samos (cf., 
e.g.. Vita G 94) or to Aesop using his body to prove his innocence to his master 
(cf., e.g.. Vita G 2-4), the term ‘performance’ will cover most of the common 
features of the various types of Aesopic communication we will be analyzing.'”
’ In focusing attention on orality and textuality in the Life of Aesop, I do not intend to enter 
into the debate over when and where the Life itself was first written down, or over the 
particular processes by which oral traditions about Aesop’s biography evolved into a writ­
ten Ii/e. See Perry 1952, 2-4, West 1984, Luzzatto 1996, and Kurke 2011. For a recent and 
judicious overview, see Konstantakos 2013.
* That is, my interest is in how ideas about oral and written storytelling surface in the narra­
tive of the Life as it has come down to us. In this arena I have been influenced by studies 
of oral and text-based storytelling traditions in the fields of social anthropology and per­
formance studies. In particular, the complex relationship between ‘embodied perfor­
mances’ and the concept of the ‘archive’, as articulated in Taylor 2003, has been instru­
mental in shaping my approach to the Life in this paper.
^ Martin 1998. For his conception of ‘performance’ Martin draws on the work of social an­
thropology and sociolinguists. Kurke 2011, 102-106, discusses the applicability to Aesop 
of Martin’s work on Greek sages in considerable detail.
‘Performance’ is a particularly useful descriptor because ‘fable-telling’ alone would be an 
inaccurate description of what we encounter in the Life. To begin with, the text of the Life 
does not itself tell fables, in the way, say, a collection of fahles such as the Collectio Au- 
gustana might reasonably be described as telling fables. Nor is it quite as simple as stating 
that, in the Life, Aesop tells fahles. As it happens, he does much that has nothing at all to 
do with fable, and, more importantly, scholars disagree over what ought to count as a ‘real 
fable’, both in the Life and beyond. Moreover, even in the few instances where there is 
universal agreement that this is precisely what Aesop is doing, there is still the fact that the 
reader is not being told a fable so much as reading a representation of a scene of fable-
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As we will see below, there are numerous ways in which Aesop’s behaviors and 
communications in the Life are shaped by the particular audience he is addressing, 
and, more generally, by the conditions and exigencies of his status." But first we 
will look briefly at two particularly revealing examples of the connections be­
tween slavery, freedom, and the manner in which Aesop communicates his wis­
dom: the episode that culminates in Aesop gaining his freedom {Vita G 83-89) 
and the one in which Aesop returns to Samos after his ambassadorial visit to Lydia 
{Vita G 100).
The first passage is Vita G 83-89, which exploits the semantic range of Xboiq- 
terms in ways that cormect Aesop’s ability to interpret signs (Tf)v too oripeiou 
X,uoiv XnPeiv, Vita G 83) with his being unshackled (X.ijaaT£ auxov. Vita G 83). 
As Aesop’s master Xanthus puts it: T am freeingyou so you can solve the portent’ 
{ak)M M® tss iva Kul oi3 xi ^uot|c. Vita G 83). In the ensuing passages, links be­
tween Aesop’s slave status and his wisdom are further developed by forms of 
A,uai(;/A.u«), with the result that Aesop ends up agreeing to perform a public X.uok; 
(‘interpretation’) of a portent for the Samian people only if he is first granted his 
A,uoiq (‘freedom’) once and for all {Vita G 89):
avSpeq Sdpioi, ouk eoxiv suXoyov 8ouA,ov eA^oOepcp dfipcp oripslov 5iaA,i3oa- 
aOai- 60SV nepiOexe poi xfiv <xrav> eipripevoiv rtapppaiav, iva sdv em- 
xux® ®(; 8A£i308poq xaq np87ionoaq xipdq d7toA,dP(o, edv 5e dpdpxco pp (bq 
5ouA,oi;, aXk’ (bq 8X£u08po(; KoA.ao0o». edv onv epoi xf|v napprioiav xfjq eX^n- 
0epla(; nepiOrixe, pexd Tcdoriq dSeiaq dp^opai Aeyeiv.
telling. Everywhere in the Life Aesop is shown performing his wisdom for partieular ad­
dressees in partieular situations, and in eaeh instanee the fable-telling - or the riddling, or 
the manipulating of objeets, or the gesturing - is framed by details about the performer’s 
own goals and motivations and the effects the performance has on the audience.
'' A number of recent studies have attended to links between the evolution of Aesop’s speech 
and his rise in social status. See especially Adrados 1979, 1981; Holzberg 1993, 1996; 
Kurke 2011; Jouanno 2011, 110-111. Aesop’s ‘rise’ in status has been approached from 
numerous scholarly perspectives. Recent studies have shown how the Life sheds light on 
the conditions of slavery and manumission in antiquity (Hopkins 1993, Ragone 1997, and 
duBois 2003); while others have shown how changes in Aesop’s communication help to 
plot the overall structure and design of the Life as a whole; cf. Mignogna 1992, Holzberg 
1993, and Ferrari 1997. Still others have read Aesop’s ‘rise’ in status as revealing of central 
tensions in Greek culture and ideology (Kurke 2003, 2011) or indicative of the Life's par­
ticipation in broader Greek discourse on the nature and development of human speech 
(Ferrari 1997, Hunter 2007). There have also been a number of studies that have empha­
sized the role of Isis and the Muses in granting Aesop the slave a voice (Winkler 1985, 
Finkelpearl 2003, Dillery 1999; cf Hunter 2007).
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Men of Samos, it doesn’t make good sense for a slave to interpret a portent 
for a free people. So, grant me freedom of speech for what I have to say. That 
way, if 1 am right, I may get the honors due to a free man. And if I am wrong,
1 won’t be punished as a slave but as a free man. If, then, you grant me free­
dom of speech, I will go ahead and speak fearlessly.
The Samian demos demands that Xanthus grant Aesop freedom (ct^ioupEV oe, 
SdvGs, eXeuOepcooov xov A’vocojiov, Vita G 89) so that he can perform his inter­
pretation (5iaMoao0ai). Soon after his successful interpretation of the portent, 
Aesop addresses a fable on the subject of slavery and freedom (the story of ‘The 
Two Ro2ids’) to the people of Samos (Vita G 94), the first fable he tells in the Life. 
As 1 will suggest below, the fact that Aesop’s switch to formal fable-telling occurs 
after he has negotiated for parrhesia and eleutheria suggests a connection be­
tween literary fables - of the sort that circulated in antiquity under Aesop’s name 
- and the conditions of freedom. Moreover, the timing retroactively implies that 
Aesop’s earlier performances of wisdom were shaped and conditioned by his en­
slavement. Indeed, as we will see, a particularly revealing aspect of Aesop’s ne­
gotiations above is his insistence that he not be subject to physical abuse (dXA,’ (be; 
eX^hOepoq KoX,ao0o6, Vita G 89) if his interpretation turns out to be wrong.
The second passage is Vita G 100, in which the description of Aesop writing 
and archiving his fables in Lydia occurs in a general atmosphere of celebration 
and memorializing. Immediately after writing, Aesop returns to Samos trium­
phantly (Vita G 100):
A’focDTiOi; ouv auxra ouyYpa\|/(ipevoq xouq idionq ^oyouq kuI puOouq, xohq d/pi 
Kttl vBv ovopa^opevouq, KaxsX-incv eiq xqv Pip^ioOrjicriv Kul ArxP(bv jtapet xou 
PamJtecix; emoxoAdq [eyevexo JuxA,iv] Jtpoi; xouq Sapfoui;, ev0a (bpo^Ei Ka- 
xri5Jidx0ou at)TOi<; ^ekev xou AiocoTion, noXkh, 5e 8ropa Kopiodpsvoq, enA^u- 
oev eii; Sdpov. kuI EKicA.qofav cruoTriodpEVoq dvEyveo xdq ETiioxoAdq xou Pa- 
oiMcoq. oi 8e Sdpioi yvtovxEq auxoiq xov Kpoioov 5iqA.Adx9“i^
AiodjTiou xipdq auxra £\|/ri9foavxo, Kai SKdAEoav xov xonov ekeTvov Aiocb- 
TiEiov, onov qv EvqAAxxypEvoq. 6 6e AiooTOq Ouoaq xaiq Mouoau; lEpov kuxe- 
OKEuaoEV auxaiq, OTijoaq pEoov auxrav Mvqpoauvqv, ouk ATioAAcova. 6 
AtcoAAoov opyio0Eli; auxco dx; x® Mapouq.
Then Aesop wrote down the stories and fables that go by his name even now 
and deposited them in the library. When he had gotten from the king a letter 
wherein he agreed to make peace with the Samians for the sake of Aesop, he 
sailed for Samos, taking many gifts with him. He called an assembly and read
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the king’s letter. The Samians, recognizing that Croesus had made peace with 
them for the sake of Aesop, voted honors for him and named the place where 
he had been turned over the Aesopeion. As for Aesop, he sacrificed to the 
Muses and then built a shrine to them, erecting in their midst a statue of Mne­
mosyne and not of Apollo. Thereupon Apollo became angry with him as he 
had once been with Marsyas.*^
The text appears to go out of its way to advertise Aesop’s newfound prestige, 
underlining that the free and celebrated sage is emphatically no longer Aesop the 
hideously ugly slave, who for the first two thirds of the narrative was relentlessly 
disrespected, maltreated, and beaten {Vita G 1-89). Further acknowledgements of 
Aesop’s status as a sage frame the passage: upon meeting him, Croesus recognizes 
Aesop as someone who possesses a universal kind of knowledge (npoc; Tf|v ei(; 
Toix; dvGpwTOix; tuxriv X,6you(; eijisTv, ‘tell me stories of the ways of fortune with 
men’, Vita G 99);*^ after he departs Samos, Aesop ‘tours the world’ (n£pi£A,0Eiv 
xfiv oiKoup^v, Vita G 101), ‘lectures to audiences for a fee’ (npripaxa 5e 
dpyopiKd XxxpPdvoav, Vita G 101), and is named ‘chamberlain’ (ETioiitoEV aiixov 
ETcl xfj(; dioucrjoEox;, Vita G 101) of King Lycurgus in Babylon. Thus the writing 
of Aesop’s fables becomes conflated with other supposedly lasting honors (npdc;), 
and with permanent signs of Aesop’s beneficence on Samos, such as the naming 
of the ‘Aesopeion’ and the erection of a shrine to the Muses.'^*
In what follows, 1 will claim that the Life maps Aesop’s experiences of en­
slavement and freedom onto his evolution into a fable-teller in ways that suggest 
an analogy to the differences between oral and written literature. This does not 
amount to a claim that the historical or ideological dimensions of slavery or of the 
Life of Aesop as a text are unimportant; far from suggesting that we ignore socio­
political realities, 1 am only suggesting that we attend more closely to the ways in
The apparent snubbing of Apollo and the eomparison with Marsyas have received much 
attention, especially in light of Aesop’s imminent, fatal confrontation with the Delphians. 
See Wiechers 1961, Jedrkiewicz 1989, Compton 1990, and now Kurke 2011.
The point is that Croesus somehow knows to ask Aesop to ‘tell stories of the ways of 
fortune with men’ ( Vita G 99), rather than asking him for help with any particular problem. 
Aesop obliges, telling a tale about a cicada and adding, in a passage that undoubtedly is 
intended to echo the opening of the text (Kita G 1), that he (Aesop) ‘speaks words of com- 
monsense and benefits the life of humans’ ((ppevf|pT| (pBeyyopai ptov tmv pspoTKOV 
(bcpekcov. Vita G 99).
The concept of the ‘archive’, as theorized within various disciplines, including especially 
social anthropology and performance studies, is helpful for thinking through the co-occur­
rence of acts of writing and memorializing. See especially Foucault 1972, Derrida 1995, 
Velody 1998, Voss and Wemer 1999, Bradley 1999, and Manoff2004. For the complex 
relationship between the ‘archive’ and ‘repertoire’, see Taylor 2003.
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which the Life thematizes slavery and freedom in its reflections on communica­
tion and on the production, transmission, and reception of Aesopica. Aesop’s con­
cerns for his physical safety in his negotiations with the Samian people {Vita G 
83-89) and the association of ‘Aesop’s fables’ with other fixed, lasting signs of 
Aesop’s wisdom {Vita G 99-101), reflect a larger pattern in the Zi/e, according to 
which two distinct types of Aesopic storytelling are systematically differentiated: 
the enslaved and the free. The former involves an emphasis on the physical pres­
ence of Aesop, his impromptu responses to the context in which he finds himself, 
and the manipulation of language and signs to turn the tables against his ad- 
dressee(s), usually his master {Vita G 1 -89); the latter involves the telling of actual 
fables, having recognizable formal features and content {Vita G 94-142). While 
Aesop’s body figures prominently in representations of storytelling during the pe­
riod of his enslavement, after he has earned his freedom and formally written 
down his fables in Lydia, a related but distinct type of corpus-based storytelling 
obtains, as the slave’s ingenious use of his body is replaced by the free fabulist s 
apparent command of an established collection of fables.'^
3. Performances During Aesop’s Enslavement
Practically all of Aesop’s actions during the period of his enslavement {Vita G 1- 
89) are reactions: his performances are crafted in response to the immediate cir­
cumstances in which he finds himself.'® In a few instances, Aesop is simply asked 
a question, by his master Xanthus or by Xanthus’ wife, to which he responds di­
rectly with a kind of aetiology.'’ More typically, however, Aesop the slave is 
given an order or threatened in some way, and he reacts by staging an improvised, 
lesson-bearing performance. That is, Aesop discovers, over and over again, a way 
to resist or challenge his master’s threats and commands by manipulating matters 
in such a way that his master - and anyone else within earshot - ends up learning
'5 Significantly, after Aesop is freed we hear almost nothing about his body. One exception 
is the description of Aesop as ‘dirty, long-haired, and pale’ (^ohvroq Kai KoprovToq Kui 
wxptovTO?, Vita G 107), after a period of imprisonment in Babylon; but these temporary 
effects on his appearance appear to have nothing to do with Aesop’s famous ugliness, 
which receives much attention in Vita G 1 -89. On the meaning(s) of Aesop’s ugliness, see 
especially Jedrkiewicz 1989, Lissarague 2000, Lefkowitz 2008, and Kurke 2011.
See Rosen 2007 on the ways in which Aesop’s reactions are typical of ancient satirists.
At Vita G 33, Aesop explains the origins of dreams to Xanthus’ wife, and, at 67, he explains 
to Xanthus why people bother to look at their own defecation; cf. 68, in which Aesop 
intervenes in a fight between Xanthus and his fellow philosophers with an account of Di­
onysus’ invention of wine.
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a kind of ‘lesson’. Either implicitly or explicitly, the lesson taught usually in­
volves matters related to the proper and improper treatment of slaves. In these 
sections of the Life, our attention is drawn to the improvisational character of Ae­
sop’s wisdom in numerous ways. Above all, it is the embedded character of these 
performances in both the immediate circumstances and in the broader context of 
Aesop’s enslavement that differentiates them from the types of performances en­
acted by Aesop the free man.
The programmatic stolen-fig episode {Vita G + W 2-3), with which the Life 
opens, is typical of the slave Aesop’s ability to discover novel ways to resist those 
who seek to do him harm despite his utter powerlessness. Characteristically, Ae­
sop uses all he has - namely, his body - to turn the tables on his adversaries and 
save his own skin.’^ Briefly, what happens is this; Aesop’s first master, whose 
name we do not learn, asks his servant (oiKETiit;, Vita W 2) Agathopous to look 
after some recently-acquired figs. Agathopous and another slave decide instead to 
eat the figs themselves and blame it on Aesop, whom they describe as ‘good for 
nothing but a whipping’ (ot)6^ alia npcjici anxro si pf] bepeoGai, Vita G 2). As 
soon as he is summoned before his master and learns he has been accused, Aesop 
‘knows he will get a beating’ (peXAcov bafpeoGai, Vita G 3). Although unable to 
speak (XaMv 8e pf| Swapcvoq, Vita G 3), Aesop manages to persuade his master 
to hold off punishment and, using only gestures, asks for a bowl of warm water 
(5id xfflv v8updx(ov pxrjOEV bScop j^^iapov. Vita G 3), which is described (signifi­
cantly) as being ‘at hand’ (jiapaKefpsvov). Aesop drinks the water, forces himself 
to vomit, and proves his innocence through his resourcefulness (5id 8e xfjq 7coA,u- 
jtEipfaq, Vita G 3). This dramatic and physical expression of Aesop’s Tio^uTCEipfa 
is programmatic in the sense that it introduces and models one of the legendary 
fabulist’s defining characteristics: namely, his ability to take whatever he can find 
‘at hand’ (TiapaKefpEvov) and, through a process of creative adaptation, transform 
it into what we might call, for lack of a better term, a teachable moment. Although 
mute, Aesop again manages to communicate that the other slaves should do as he 
did (xouxo fi^uBoe xal xoxx; onv8onXx)U(; anxou jioifjoai. Vita G 3). They promptly 
vomit up their guilt and are beaten in turn, learning the ‘lesson’ - which is articu­
lated in the spirit if not the form of a conventional epimythium - that those who 
scheme up trouble for others only bring trouble upon themselves.’^
While Aesop’s initial muteness makes his vulnerable body and his non-verbal 
gestures more prominent than they are after he gains the ability to speak at Vita G **
** Aesop is introduced in Vita G 1 as ‘speechless ... dumb, and unable to talk’, but he is later 
visited in a dream by Isis and granted the gift of speech in Vita G 6-8.
5ep6pevot 8e eKCivot eyvtoaav aatpak&c, 6xi 6 Kata aXXou ptixaveuopevoi; kokov ainbc, 
Ka0’ EauTov) TOUTO XovGdvEi woicov {Vita G 3).
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7-8,^° the situation as it unfolds in the stolen-fig episode is analogous to a number 
of episodes in Vita G 1-89. Moreover, the slave Aesop’s body - particularly in its 
susceptibility to physical abuse - remains a significant element in his perfor­
mances throughout the period of his enslavement. The pattern that emerges is this: 
Aesop is threatened in some way; although powerless, Aesop makes use of some­
thing ‘at hand’ and somehow parlays it into a lesson-bearing performance. The 
threat is not always explicit (see below), but every command or task Aesop’s first 
master or second master, Xanthus {Vita G 28-90), gives him is given under the 
implicit threat of physical punishment.
Over time Xanthus comes to see Aesop’s quick thinking and improvisational 
skills as assets. After hearing him respond to the mistress’ question about the na­
ture of dreams {Vita G 33-34), Xanthus realizes that Aesop ‘quickly finds the right 
thing to say’ (eupacnAoyoi;, Vita G 34).^' Xanthus himself is described as unable 
on the spur of the moment to find answers to a philosophical conundrum (6 Hdv- 
Ooq dKouoaq (piXooocpou pav ^f|XTipa, pf| eupioKcav auxo 8e TaxECoq dvaA,uoai, Vita 
G 35),^^ but when he acknowledges Aesop’s sharp wit (dyxivoiaq. Vita G 70),^^ 
he seeks to benefit from his slave’s special gifts and he asks for help.^"* Moreover, 
Aesop, for his part, seems to be well aware of his own improvisational skill set, 
and in the same terms described by the narrator and other characters: beoTtoxa, si 
XI Tispl XoyiKoi) ^T|xf|paxoq, sxoipcoq sx® dTioKpivaoGai (‘Master, if it is a question 
of words, 1 am ready with answers’. Vita G 84); s;nA,uoopai syd) Kal suKaipcoq 
7ipoaicA,T10f|oopai Xsyeiv (‘I’ll have a solution, and at the proper moment’. Vita G 
85).
Thus the link between Aesop’s improvisational skills and the circumstances 
of his enslavement is inscribed in the Life of Aesop from the very beginning, and 
in such a way as to mark the slave’s performances of wisdom as fundamentally 
bound to his condition. Aesop’s slave status frames and determines the direction 
of these performances. Indeed, the motivation behind Aesop’s actions is often to 
resist or to challenge his master. This is most evident in a series of scenes in which
On Aesop’s receipt of the gift of speech from Isis, see Winkler 1985, Finkelpearl 2003, 
Dillery 1999; cf. Hunter 2007.
Cf eoemvoTiTov (‘sharp thinker’). Vita G 72.
^ Cf Vita G 82, where Xanthus’ inability to think and act quickly is described in the follow­
ing terms: 6 6e HdvGoi; ecrtri su; t6 pfeov Kal pT)8^ euptoKcov Kaxd vouv eijteiv eXaPev 
Sioptav ojicog TO oripeiov ETtiX-ucrn (‘Xanthus came forward and, unable to discover any­
thing to say, requested time to interpret the portent’).
Cf St sSpdorepoi; Kai ouveioq, ‘you are such a good guesser and so smart’. Vita G 79; oh 
peya Saipoviov ei, ‘you are a great genius’. Vita G 80.
Sfepal aou, AiotoTte, ei 5uvax6v ooi <5id> xfji; aeauxon dyxivoiaq, edpav xwa npdtpacnv, 
8i’ fj^ vucfiaio fj xd<; aovOfiKac 5uiX,uaouai, Vita G 70.
242 JEREMY B. LEFKOWITZ
Aesop repeatedly disobeys and embarrasses Xanthus by putting excessive pres­
sure on the precision of his master’s commands and interpreting them so literally 
that the words lose their intended meaning. In the first scene {Vita G 38), Xanthus 
orders Aesop to take an oil flask and towels (apov em x£ip®v oou kfjicuGov kevnd 
T8) in order to accompany him to the bath. Aesop reacts by deciding to teach his 
master a lesson; ‘Masters who show an unnecessarily stem attitude about the ser­
vice they want have themselves to blame for the trouble they get into. I’ll teach 
this philosopher a lesson in how to give orders’Aesop then picks up the oil 
flask - without putting oil in it - and follows his master. When Xanthus asks for 
his oil flask and realizes there is nothing in it, he asks, ‘Aesop, where is the oil?’ 
(AiocoTtc, TO ekaiov too; Vita G 38). Aesop’s response is as follows:
“siq oiKov.” 6 SotvGoq ksysi “6id tI;” Aiooojroi; ksyei “oti ou pot eiTiag ‘apov 
kf)Ko0ov Kai Xevna’, shxiov 8e ouk eijca(;. e5ei onv pE ppbEv x®v EipppEvrov 
nXsov JcoiEiv ejceI ion vopou ocpakEix; Tiktiydav ■ujtEuOnvoq p priv.” Kai ev toutco
“At home”. Xanthus said, “Why is that”? Aesop said, “Because you told me 
‘Take an oil flask and towels’, but you did not say ‘oil’. I was not supposed 
to do anything more than what you said; since if I messed up my command I 
would pay for it with a beating”. And with that he was silent.
Our attention is drawn to the ways in which Aesop discovers how to make creative 
use of all he has to work with - his master’s exact words (apov kf|KU0ov xal 
kevna) and the objects involved (e.g., kf|KO0ov), which Aesop has ‘in hand’ (ejcI 
XEipwv) - to assert himself and prove a point.^^ Adaptation and appropriation of 
the immediate context are vital components of improvisation, and utterly neces­
sary for the slave who has no possessions - none, that is, except his body, which 
the entire performance is designed to try to protect (ejieI ton vopon ocpakciq
oi T(p vro TtepOTiKpoi nepl SiaKoviav SecmoTai KaKoSaipovtag eavTOii; ytvovrai Ttapamoi. 
eym toutov tov cpikooocpov 7tai8e6a(0, iva pdGti kox; amdv 8d emxdxTeiv, Gta G 38. 
Almost identical exchanges occur in subsequent scenes, as when Aesop is told to bring 
Xanthus a footbath, but, as Aesop remarks, he is not told (ook eiTtei;) to put water in it or 
to wash his master’s feet (Afoowtog keyei ‘einag ‘jiapdGeg kacdvriv’, ouk sotsc ‘Pdke u5cop 
Kol vt\|/ov pon xoug noSag’, Vita G 4G); when Aesop is told to ‘cook lentil for dinner’, but 
not told (on ydp poi eiTiag) to cook ‘lentils’, for ‘the one is singular and the other is plural 
(Alarortog Xeyei ‘vat, on vdo uoi eutac 6xi “(paxov e\|/r|oov’’ Kai on (paxong; 6 psv ydp ecmv 
eviKog, oi 5e 7ckr|GnvxiKot’, Vita G 41). Again, as Vita G 51, a typically vague command 
from Xanthus motivates Aesop to say to himself; ‘I will show him not to give me moronic 
orders’ (Ataomog Jipog eanxov keyei ‘eyd) anxm 5et^(o pcopd pf) 8iaxdxxeaGai’).
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nX.Tjyrav ■f)ji£i30t)vo<^ T^fiTiv). Whether it is deliberately forgetting to bring oil to the 
bath or cooking inappropriate meals by deliberately misconstruing Xanthus in­
structions (see note 26), Aesop’s repeated subversions of his master’s authority 
are marked in the text in different ways: at Vita G 64, Xanthus describes Aesop’s 
insubordination as ‘game-playing’ (apTtai^cov) and begs Aesop to become a well- 
disposed slave (dpKEi EpTiaiCcov poi, A-fj^ov to Xxnrtov kuI EuvoiKrai; poi 6o6>ieue); 
at Vita G 54, Xanthus laments Aesop’s determination to ‘turn (my) words around’ 
(Td av(o Kdi® 5uxX£w); finally, at Vita G 55, one of Xanthus’ students calls Aesop 
an ‘abusive and malicious slave’ (cpiloAxiiSopoq xai KaKEvrpExfi<; 6on^q ouxoq) 
and describes his efforts to ‘drive (his master) crazy’ (Tayecoc^ oe eIi; paviav TiEpi- 
XpEVj/El).
The necessity that Aesop figure out a way to make creative use of his master’s 
orders or ‘whatever is at hand’ reflects, on some level, the powerlessness and 
helplessness of his position?'^ As a slave, subject to physical abuse at every turn, 
Aesop’s body is utterly vulnerable. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the 
important role of Aesop’s body in the Life of Aesop from a number of different 
critical perspectives.^* Here I do not wish to focus on corporeality per se, rather,
I want to focus on bodies in order to draw attention to the degree to which Aesop’s 
lesson-bearing performances in Vita G 1-89 are grounded in the physical, material 
situation in which he finds himself Indeed, it is no exaggeration to claim that 
Aesop’s improvisational wisdom in Vita G 1-89 is dependent on the presence of 
bodies - both his own and those of his addressees - and on the particular circum­
stances in which these bodies find themselves.
There are two primary ways in which bodies figure in Aesop’s performances 
of wisdom in Vita G 1-89. First, the body and bodily functions feature prominently 
as themes of the slave Aesop’s performances. As a result, Aesop often uses his 
own body and the bodies of others to prove a point or to communicate. Second, 
the utter precariousness of Aesop’s slave body is always felt and shapes the per­
formances in fundamental ways. After considering some manifestations of the 
body in Aesop’s performances in Vita G 1-89,1 am going to claim that all of these
2'' Indeed, this essential powerlessness is preeisely what Leslie Kurke’s reeent work on Aesop 
has brought to the fore. Borrowing Claude Levi-Strauss’ notion of the ‘eultural bricoleur , 
Kurke claims that Aesop is a ‘culture hero for those who feel themselves disempowered, 
so his ability to extort the self-incrimination of the powerful functions as a wish-fulfillment 
fantasy (or how-to guide) for the marginal or weaker members of society’ (Kurke 2011, 
200). Kurke’s reading of Aesopic bricolage focuses on the outward, ideological potential­
ities of the Life of Aesop', but there is more to be said about the ways in which the link 
between slavery and improvisation in the Life sheds light on the inner workings of the 
narrative and, I would claim, on the literary history of the Aesopic tradition writ large.
2* Lissarague 2000; duBois 2003; Lefkowitz 2008; Kurke 2011.
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heavily embodied performances stand in contrast to representations of Aesop’s 
fable-telling in Vita G 90-142, in which the significance of bodies is far less 
marked and in which Aesop’s own style of wisdom begins to take on some of the 
characteristics of the disembodied literary artifact.
Throughout the first half of the Life of Aesop, our attention is repeatedly 
drawn to Aesop’s hideous body and to his use of his own body and the bodies of 
others to make a point or otherwise communicate. Indeed, bodies are the primary 
tools of Aesop’s improvisation, and much of Aesop’s demonstration of wit in 
these chapters either involves bodies directly (vomiting at, e.g.. Vita G 2-3; defe­
cating, at Vita G 67) or is presented in the context of others’ reactions to seeing 
Aesop’s body, whether it is his ugliness (e.g., at Vita G 11, 15, 27, 55, 87-88) or 
Xanthus’ wife seeing him naked (Vita G 75-76). Other times a reaction is trig­
gered by Aesop’s observation of the bodies and bodily functions of others, such 
as Xanthus’ public urination (Vita G 28) or his mistress’ exposed ass (Vita G 77). 
Bodies and bodily functions figure less explicitly but no less significantly when 
Aesop is charged with the care of his master’s body (oil flask for the bath. Vita G 
38; water for foot-bath. Vita G 40) or assisting with his master’s eating and drink­
ing (figs. Vita G 2-4; shopping for vegetables. Vita G 34; preparing lentil. Vita G 
39; serving bathwater to drink. Vita G 40; serving pig’s feet for dinner. Vita G 42- 
43; preparing food for dog, not mistress. Vita G 44-50; cooking tongue for dinner. 
Vita G 51-55; attending a drinking party. Vita G 68 f.; helping Xanthus ‘drink the 
sea dry’. Vita G 70-74).
Aesop’s own body is, from the beginning of the Life, one of his primary 
modes of communication, both intentionally (through deliberate gestures) and un­
intentionally (through others’ responses to his ugliness, his nudity, etc.). As we 
have observed, it is through gestures (8id xo&v veupdxcov) that Aesop is able to 
prove his innocence in the stolen-fig episode. Similarly, in his interactions with a 
priestess of Isis (Vita G 4-7), which lead directly to Aesop being granted the gifts 
of speech (Vita G 7), Aesop uses ‘gestures’ (fjp^axo biaveueiv. Vita G 4) to ask 
her if she has lost her way, then ‘leads her by the hand’ (ejnXapPdvexai xfjq 
auxfic; Ktti pyaysv. Vita G 4) to a grove where he offers her food before ‘leading 
her again’ (6 5s "nyaysv auxf|v. Vita G 5) and ‘pointing out’ (Ssl^aq, Vita G 5) the 
proper road. There is an almost comic exaggeration of what Aesop is able to com­
municate with non-verbal gestures: we are told that Aesop ‘began to nod (to the 
priestess) as if to say “Why have you left the road and come to the farm?”’ (pp^axo 
SiavEueiv xal 8T)koTv ‘5id xi djio^uiouoa xfiv drjpooiav 656v eiq xouxo x6 Kxfjpa 
8ioe^f)A,u0aq;’ Vita G 4). Later (Vita G 9), in the same vein, when the overseer 
Zenas learns that Aesop can now talk, he fears the consequences:
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OT8 yap sTi vco56(; Tjv 5i£V£d^ poi 6xi ‘eav 8X,0ti 6 580TOTr)(; pou psxaoxfioa) 
08 xfj(; oiKovopiac;- Kaxpyopf)oa) ydp oou 5id xmv vsDiidxcov.’ 8i ow v8dnaoiv 
87criyy8i^axo, noXk& paXAov Inlxbv 7C8io8i.
When he was still mute he would gesture to me as if to say ‘If my master 
eomes I’ll have you removed from your position; I will accuse you by means 
of gestures.’ If, then, he would bring charges against me with gestures, how 
much more persuasive will he be speaking!
Such aggrandizement of the communicatory powers of Aesop’s gestures also has 
the effect of establishing a connection between all of Aesop’s performances.^^ It 
is as if the power of speech merely intensifies Aesop’s communicative abilities 
rather than simply marking a replacement of the physical with the verbal.^®
From the beginning, the mute Aesop’s physical vulnerability is linked to his 
complete dependence upon his body for communication. As we have seen, the 
fellow slaves who conspire to frame Aesop in the programmatic stolen-fig epi­
sode, describing him as ‘good for nothing but a beating’ (oudev aXko KpenEX am& 
8i pf) 58p8o0ai), do so knowing that Aesop will be beaten precisely because he 
cannot speak.^' As Corinne Jouanno has observed, the persistent violence against 
Aesop’s body increases the reader’s emotional involvement in the narrative.^^ But 
the threat of violence also frames and determines Aesop’s actions in more funda­
mental ways. The reader is constantly reminded in Vita G 1-89 that his master 
may beat Aesop at anytime.^^ Moreover, Aesop and his master are presented as 
fully aware of the stakes: at Vita G 38, Aesop’s show of resistance against the 
strict language of his master’s orders is carried out with the knowledge that he is
There are also hints of a more profound commitment to the signifying powers of bodies in 
the Life. For example, throughout the entire scene on the auction block {Vita G 20-27), 
when Xanthus purchases Aesop, there is frequent reference to bodies, including detailed 
descriptions of each slave’s body and dress {Vita G 21), and a number of evaluative com­
ments {Vita G 21, 23, 26); indeed, Xanthus explicitly encourages onlookers to view the 
display of bodies as a kind of philosophical problem {Vita G 22): pf) vopftniTe xf|v (piko- 
aorpfav Sid Xbycov povov oucrcdvai, aXka Kai Sid xcov spyiov. Cf Lefkowitz 2008.
Cf Vita G 13: f| Se Kaxaarpoipfi aoTon xi; dip’ on qp^axo laXdv Tiepfepyoq yeyovev (‘What 
is to become of him (Aesop)? From the moment he started talking he has been trouble’).
6 Se Afaonioi; XnA^iv pq Suvdpevoq onxcoq Sapqaexai, Kai xqv emOupiov oon ei Ttenkq- 
pojKiix; (‘Since Aesop cannot speak he will be beaten, and you’ll get just what you desire’), 
Vita G 2. Moreover, before Aesop improvises his defense, he himself is said to have real­
ized he will get a beating (psXXtov SafpeoOai).
Jouanno 2006, 39 note 17. Cf Hopkins 1993, 15 note 23, on fear and physical punishment 
in the Life of Aesop.
“ Vita G 2, 3, 42, 50, 56, 58, 77, 80, and 83.
246 JEREMY B. LEFKOWITZ
susceptible to physical violence if he does not perform well (eSei ow pa pp6^ 
T®v eiprip^cflv jtXaov jioieiv ejcsl ton vopon ocpaAal; jcA,pymv UTiehGuvoc; ppT|v). 
Later {Vita G 42), when Xanthus becomes frustrated and embarrassed by his 
slave’s insubordinate challenges, he attempts ‘to find some pretext to thrash him’ 
(6 HdvGoq ^T|Tmv cupoppfiv 5i’ pq paoxiymoei xov Aiocotiov). In addition, there are 
times when Aesop cannot figure out a way to avoid physical abuse, despite his 
obvious blamelessness: for example, he is ‘thoroughly beaten’ (Eddpri empsA^q) 
at Vita G 77, when he reports two crows outside but Xanthus only sees one (one 
flew away); and at Vita G 80, Xanthus orders Aesop to be ‘bound and locked up’ 
(ekeAeuoev auxov 8E0£vxa ouyKAEiaOfjvai) despite Aesop’s success in decoding 
an epitaph and discovering a buried treasure of gold for his master.^'* Thus even 
when Aesop can communicate cogently and eloquently, his actions are deter­
mined and constrained by the fundamental vulnerability of the conditions of en­
slavement.
4. Representations of Fable-Telling After Manumission
As we have seen, for the duration of his enslavement the text repeatedly highlights 
the ways in which Aesop must draw directly on his surroundings to improvise his 
performances. But once the fabulist is no longer a slave - no longer subject to the 
threats and abuse of a master - his wisdom begins to take on many of the qualities 
of the disembodied literary artifact. One gets the sense that the free Aesop is in 
command of a kind of corpus, from which he can draw on occasion to advise or 
warn his addressee(s). This is partly a product of the many links between his 
words in these sections and familiar material in the extant corpora of the ancient 
fable tradition.^^ But even without these demonstrable connections there are a
Vita G 79-80. Although Xanthus praises Aesop’s quick wit and wisdom {Vita G 79), and 
calls him a ‘genius’ {Vita G 80), Aesop loses in the end. Aesop generates multiple inter­
pretations of the jumbled lehers in an attempt to manipulate the lying Xanthus to keep his 
promise, but ultimately Xanthus does not share the gold or grant Aesop freedom - instead 
he binds him and locks him up.
This includes two ‘elassic’ fables that were well known in antiquity and frequently ascribed 
to Aesop both in- and outside of the collections (cf. van Dijk 1995, 135), both of which 
appear in remarkably similar form in the Collectio Augustana: ‘Eagle and Dung Beetle’ (= 
Perry 3), at Vita G 135-139, and ‘Wolves and Sheep’ (= Perry 153), at Vita G 97. The 
‘Eagle and Dung Beetle’ also surfaces three times in the Aristophanic corpus: Wasps 1446- 
1448; Lysistrata 691-695; Peace 127-134; cf. also Lucian, lean 10, 134-139. For ‘Wolves 
and Sheep’, cf. Plu. Dem. 23,5; Babr. 93; Aphth. 21; Ademar 43; Rom. Anglicus 31 
(Hervieux 1893-1899, 2:586). Other fables Aesop tells in the Life that are attested in the 
collections are: ‘Cicada’ {Vita G 99); ‘Widow and Plowman’ {Vita G 129; cf. the story of
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number of ways in which our attention is drawn to patterns and internal consistt 
encies in his stories, contributing to a sense that there are certain fixed and tradi­
tional types of stories the free Aesop tells. Indeed, the nine stories Aesop tells in 
the Life that scholars most commonly acknowledge as ‘fables’ all appear in Vita 
G 90-142; ‘Two Roads’ (94); ‘Wolves and Sheep’ (97); ‘Cicada’ (99); ‘Widow 
and Plowman’ (129); ‘Simple-minded Daughter’ (131); ‘Mouse and Frog’ (133); 
‘Eagle and Dung Beetle’ (135-139); ‘Farmer’ (140); ‘Father and Daughter’ 
(141).^^ Other passages in the later scenes of the Life of Aesop, including the ex­
tended borrowing from the Aramaic Life of Ahiqar (Vita G 101-123), also repre­
sent the free Aesop as possessing a kind of storehouse of wisdom. While his words 
of advice and warning in these sections remain apposite to the situations in which 
he finds himself, they are nevertheless detachable from their contexts and coher­
ent as standalone narratives in ways that vomiting figs or playing tricks with oil 
flasks are not.
The free Aesop’s words consistently display a surprising number of distinct 
narrative elements and structural features, which, in combination with one
the ‘Widow of Ephesus’, found also in Petronius 111-112, and PhaedrusTpp. 15); ‘Simple- 
minded Daughter’ (Vita G 129); ‘Mouse and Frog’ (Vita G 133; cf. Batrachomyomachia 
10-104; Ademar 4, Odo 21b).
5*’ Taking into account variations in the different recensions of the Life of Aesop and m the 
heterogeneous sets of criteria used to determine what counts as a legitimate fable , schol­
ars generally agree that Aesop only begins to tell proper fables once he has gained his 
freedom; cf. Nojgaard 1964,471; Holzberg 1992,1996; Hagg 1997,179; Pervo 1998,104; 
Shiner 1998, 162; Hunter 2007, 55. But, to be sure, there has been disagreement among 
scholars on the matter of just how many proper fables are to be found in the Life of Aesop. 
While the most common total count of fables in the Life of Aesop is nine (see above) as in 
Nojgaard 1964, 471, and Holzberg 1992, 1996 (cf. Shiner 1998, 162), Perry 1952 seems 
to count twelve. Two of these - Perry 3 and Perry 153 - are omitted from the section m 
Aesopica entitled ENUMERANTUR FABULAE NOVAE QUAE VlTAAESOPl TRADITAE 
SUNT (‘Listing of new fables transmitted in the Life of Aesop') [Perry 379-388] for no 
other reason than that they are known from the Collectio Augustana and thus not new . 
Of Perry’s twelve, another two (Vita G 33, 67) occur during the period of Aesop s enslave­
ment (see above). Van Dijk 1995 identifies thirteen fables in Vita G (twelve in Vita IF and 
ten in the so-called Planudean vita) and Jouanno 2011 counts sixteen, dividing the total 
into thirteen fables ‘en bonne et due forme' and three fables transformees' (105). Van 
Dijk and Jouanno consider different material in Vita G 1-90 to count as ‘fable’, either be­
cause it may find echoes in the fable collections or may be linked to known fables m other 
ways. Both scholars also acknowledge and discuss the ways in which Aesop s fable-telling 
in Vita G 90-142 is notably distinct from the earlier passages and has even closer and more 
demonstrable links to the fable tradition. Thus, regardless of whether one’s definition of 
‘fable’ leads to a count of nine, twelve, thirteen, or sixteen total fables in the Life, it is 
widely acknowledged that there is something qualitatively different about Aesop’s manner 
of story-telling after he has been freed.
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another, amount to a generic type of wisdom. Perhaps the clearest example of this 
is the way in which Aesop now introduces his performances by announcing his 
intention to ‘tell a fable’ or calling upon his addressee(s) to ‘listen to a
fable’The very first fable Aesop tells in the Li/e begins with a traditional and 
indefinite ‘Once upon a time’ (iioxe),^'' while several others open by convention­
ally setting the scene in a distant and imagined past when animals spoke the same 
language as humans (e.g., kuG’ 6v Kaipov opoipcova poav xd xou^ dvGpdutoiQ, 
‘In the time when animals were homophonous with men’, Fita G 96).'’° The 
themes and manner of characterization in these fables also repeat themselves and, 
moreover, are typical in the tradition. For example, the conventionally vague ad­
jective ‘some’ (xiq) to describe fable characters (animal or human) is used repeat­
edly: ‘some cicada’ (xiva dKpiSa, Vita G 99), ‘some woman’ (yuvr] uq. Vita G 
129; 130; Vita IT 141), and ‘some plowman’ (dpoxpuav xiq. Vita G 129)."^' In ad­
dition, the fables the free Aesop tells also display what is perhaps the most dis­
tinctive characteristic of the genre, the epimythium or ‘lesson’, which explicitly 
spells out the relevance or ‘lesson’ of the fable.^^ To be sure, while a slave, Ae­
sop’s wisdom performances often had a ‘lesson’ to teach (as we have seen, usually 
directed at his master). But the structure and delivery of the epimythia appended 
to each of the free Aesop’s stories are standardized in accordance with the formu­
lae and conventions of the extant fable tradition.^*^
” Vita G 93, 96, 129, 130, 134, 141.
38 Vita G 132, 140.
3® Vita G 93; cf. 67. Cf. van Dijk 1995 and Jouanno 2011, 106.
The same formula appears in fable openings at Vita G 99 and 133. For this conventional 
fable opening, cf. also X. Mem. 2,17,13; Call. Iamb. 2 (Pf. 192); Babr. ProL, Max. Tyr. 
19. Cf. Karadagli 1981.
Some characters in these fables, such as the beetle and the cicada, are virtual celebrities in 
the fable tradition. For the cicada in Aesopica, cf Perry 184 (‘The Ass and the Cicada ), 
Perry 241 (‘The Cicada and the Fox’); Perry 373 (‘The Ant and the Cicada’; cf Babrius 
140, Avianus 34, et al.); Perry 397 (‘The Bird Catcher and the Cicada’; cf Aphthonius 4); 
Perty 470 = Plato’s Phaedrus 259b-c; Perry 507 (‘The Cricket and the Owl’; cf Phaedrus
42
43
3,16).
For the history of the epimythium and its significance in the genre, see espec. Perry 1940. 
Vita G 97: s5ei 8s onv upaq <KaTd> xov puOov pp eircrj Tonq xprimoui; 7tapa8i56vai (‘Ac­
cording to the fable, you should not rashly hand over useful men’); 99: draauTwi; Kdyd) 
(‘Just so 1...’); 129: wcrre Kal cm (‘And you, too...’); 131: opoto? koI epol cmvePp, (pO£ 
(‘In the same way also it has turned out for me, friend...’); 133: opoicoi; Kdym, dvSpei^ 
djtoOavcbv upTv pdpoq eaopai (‘ In the same way also, in dying 1 will be death for you... ’); 
139: opotoq Koi upeJi;, dv8pe? Aekcpioi, pf) dTipdcmxs to iepov (‘In the same way also you, 
Delphians, do not dishonor the shrine... ’); 140: maauxcoq ow xdycb Suacpopcoq syco CSo it 
is also that I am aggrieved...’); Vita W 141: xouxo xdyd) Jtpo?updq, w AeXxpoi (‘This also 
I (feel) toward you, Delphians... ’).
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Let us now turn to look more closely at one of the fables Aesop tells in this 
section, the fable of the ‘Frog and Mouse’ {Vita G 133), in order to observe how 
these performances, although adapted to their contexts,'*^' are marked as traditional 
material. These fables are not direct responses to questions posed by an interloc­
utor or hyper-literal interpretations of a master’s commands; rather, as if drawing 
upon an established store of pre-fabricated narratives, Aesop chooses and adapts 
fables to fit the context by setting up various symbolic correspondences between 
fable and the situation in which he finds himself. Aesop tells the ‘Frog and Mouse’ 
fable after he is informed by the Delphians that he is to be executed that very day 
for the crimes of temple-robbery and blasphemy Understanding the severity of 
the threat (AiocoTioq i5d)v auxoix; cucsiAoupevouq, Vita G 132-133), Aesop pre­
sumably expects the fable to persuade the Delphians to change their minds:'*^
‘Xdvov dKouoaxe’. oi 5e £3i8xpE\|/av aikov Ittsw. 6 5e Afoconoq (prioiv {Vita 
G 133] ‘oxe pv xd L&a ouowmva. pui; (piA,idoa(; Paxpa^q) eKciA£0£V auxov em 
5emvov kuI eiOTiyayev auxov eic; xapieTov tiA,ouoiov tuxvu, 8(p’ ® qv dpxoq, 
Kpsaq, xupoq, eAxiTai, ioxdSeg- kui cprioiv ‘eo01£.’ X,Ti(p0Elq 6 pdxpaxoq
(prioiv ‘eA0£ Kal cri) mp’ spoi 8£utvf|0(BV, iva oe KaXmq Mpra.’ dTupyayEV 6e 
auxov Eiq Mpvriv xai cppoiv ‘KoA,uppr]oov.’ 6 5e puq- ‘KoA,upPfjoai ouk etxi- 
oxapai.’ 6 pdxpayoq- ‘syra oe 5i5d^o).’ Sfjoaq xe Mvcp xov Ji66a xou puoq Jtpoq 
xov iSiov 7c68a [£8qoEv] <fj^xo Eiq xfiv X,ipvriv> xal xov puv soupEV. 6 8e puq 
TxviyopEvoq euxev ‘vEKpoq o)v ^mvxd oe £K8iKfioco.’ xauxa Eijxovxoq auxou xa- 
xa8uq 6 pdxpa^oq ejxvi^ev auxov. XEipEvou 8e auxou sm xou i38axoq xal sm- 
TiXEOvxoq, xopa^ qpTtaoEV xov puv ouv xo Paxpdx® ouv8£8£p£vov, xaxa- 
(payd)v 8e xov puv s8pd^axo xai xou paxpdxou. ouxoac 6 uuc xov PdxpaYOv 
£££8ixnoEV. ouofcoc xdYCQ, dv8o£c. d7to0avd)v uuiv uoooc soouav xal ydp Au- 
8ioi, BaPu?i,ft)\aoi, xal oxe86v f| 'EXldq 6X.ri xov spov xapiiloovxai 0dvaxov.’
‘Listen to this story’. They permitted him to speak. Aesop said: [133] ‘When 
all the animals spoke the same language, a mouse became friends with a frog 
and invited him to dinner. Fie brought him to a richly-stocked storeroom, in 
which there was bread, meat, cheese, olives, and dried figs. ‘Eat,’ he told him.
^ Van Dijk 1995.
'•5 Vita G 132: oi 8e A^ioi eiaeX,96vTeq Ttpoq xov Aiacojtov e(pT|aav ‘and Kpripvoi) oe 8ei 
pX.Ti0fivai OTipepov- outox; ydp ae e\|;T|(piaap8v dveXeiv, d^iov ovxa <mq iep6cn)kov> xal 
pXdocpTipov, iva pr|8e xacpfjq d^uoBfii;. exoipaaai aeauxov.’ (The Delphians came to Aesop 
and said, ‘Today you must be thrown from the cliff. For this is the way we voted to kill 
you, a temple-robber and blasphemer unworthy of burial. Prepare yourself).
For the historical and broader ideological implications of the Life's representation of Ae­
sop’s confrontation with the Delphians, see espec. Wiechers 1961 and now Kurke 2011.
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Being received so hospitably, the frog said: ‘You should come to my place 
for dinner, too, so I can give you a good reception!’ He led the mouse to his 
pond and said ‘Dive ini’ But the mouse said, ‘I don’t know how to dive.’ So 
the frog said, ‘I’ll teach you.’ Using a chord, he tied the mouse’s foot to his 
own foot and, jumping into the pond, dragged the mouse behind. As he was 
drowning, the mouse said, ‘Even though I am dead I will get revenge on you.’ 
As he said these words the frog went under water and drowned the mouse. As 
he lay there, floating upon the surface of the water, a raven snatched up the 
mouse, still tied to the frog, and after the raven ate the mouse he also ate up 
the frog. This is how the mouse punished the frog. So. too, men of Delphi, in 
death I shall be vour doom. For the Lydians, Babylonians, and almost all of 
Greece will reap the harvest of my dying.’
On the one hand, there are a number of demonstrable formal and thematic links 
to the fable tradition. The explicit announcement of the ‘fable’ (‘Xdyov 
dKonoate’), the conventional opening (oxs rjv xd opoqxova), and the formal­
ized epimythium (onxcoq 6 png xov Paxpa^ov s^cdiicrioev. opoieog Kdycb, dv5peg, 
djto0avd)v npTv popog eoopai) all mark the tale as traditional. The fable also treats 
themes that are well attested both in- and outside ancient collections. As van Dijk 
has shown, in representations of Aesop’s fable-telling in the Life, a connection 
‘between the fable and both its direct context and the Life as a whole can be ob­
served’."*^ Here I would like to extend Van Dijk’s study by emphasizing that there 
is a significant difference between, on the one hand, a direct connection between 
the specific circumstances in which Aesop finds himself and his particular perfor­
mance, and, on the other hand, an indirect, symbolic connection - one that needs 
to be explicitly drawn out and explained in order to make sense. In this case, ac­
cording to the analogy set up by the fable, the mouse corresponds to the unjustly 
murdered Aesop, the frog to the Delphians, and the raven to the avenging force 
that punishes the guilty party; like the raven, the Babylonians, Lydians, and all of 
Greece ‘will reap the harvest’ (KapTtioovxai) of Aesop’s death.
One of the many peculiarities of the composition of the Life of Aesop is the 
extended borrowing (occurring at Vita G 101-123) of episodes from the vita of 
the legendary Assyrian sage Ahiqar^^ The earliest text of the Life of Ahiqar, an 
Aramaic papyrus, is dated 420-400 BCE, and it is generally accepted that Greeks 
first came into contact with the legend of Ahiqar in roughly the same period. 
Scholars have identified numerous points of contact between the Aesop and
Van Dijk 1995, 143.
See Perry 1952,4-10; Conybeare, Harris, and Lewis, 1913,2:715-784; Lindenberger 1983, 
2:479-507; Oettinger 1992; Kussly 1992.
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Ahiqar legends, and it is difficult to say with certainty whether the Ahiqar material 
is a late addition to a pre-existing Aesopic vita or whether it is more of a kernel 
around which a fragmented Aesopic legend took shape and expanded during the 
Hellenistic period.'*® The episodes borrowed from the story of Ahiqar have Aesop 
traveling to Babylon {Vita G 101-111; 123) and Egypt (Vita G 112-123), provid­
ing the Life with an exotic Near-Eastern aura and serving as a sort of bridge be­
tween Aesop’s experiences on Samos (Vita G 20-100) and his confrontation with 
the Delphians (Vita G 124-142). Reflecting general opinion, Tomas Hagg has ob­
served that the Ahiqar material is ‘quite alien to the spirit of the rest of the Life,' 
in particular the way in which Aesop’s precepts are ‘almost wholly irrelevant to 
their context’.^® It is not my intention here to contradict this view by claiming that 
the Ahiqar material in fact fits quite well in the Life. But I would like to draw 
attention to some broad analogies between certain aspects of the Ahiqar sections 
and other representations of the free Aesop’s fable-telling in Vita G 90-142.
Specifically, atchs. 109-110, the sage’s manner of imparting wisdom is anal­
ogous to the other nine representations of the free Aesop’s fable-telling in two 
important aspects: (1) Aesop is shown delivering established, fixed forms of wis­
dom (not presented as improvisations); and (2) Aesop’s words of wisdom are of 
a generalized character, not bound to the exigencies of a particular context.^*
The passages in which Aesop is assimilated to Ahiqar begin with a rapid and 
dizzying series of events, immediately following upon Aesop’s writing down and 
archiving of his fables in Samos {Vita G 100). There are a number of ways in 
which Aesop is acknowledged now as a famous sage, comparable in stature to the 
legendary Ahiqar, enjoying a comfortable proximity to royalty and expanding his 
reputation in the Near East. Having been ‘recognized with many honors’ {Vita G 
101), Aesop departs Samos and ‘tours the world’ {Vita G 101), ‘lectures to audi­
ences for a fee’ Vita G 101) and settles first in Babylon where he ‘gives an expo­
sition of philosophy’ and is ‘acclaimed as a great man by the Babylonians’ {Vita 
G 101).^^ Aesop ‘solves philosophical conundrums’ for the king Lycurgus
''® Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Theophrastus a work entitled ‘Akicharos’ (D.L. 5,50). Es­
sential questions about how and when the Ahiqar material came to be incorporated into the 
Aesopic vita tradition are vexed and remain open. Adrados 1979 dates the establishment 
of a connection between Ahiqar and Aesop to the fifth century BCE (cf. Kurke 2011), 
while West 1984 dates the coimection to the Hellenistic period.
5“ Hagg 1997,182.
Two of the proverbs spoken by Aesop in the ‘Ahiqar’ sections in fact find echoes in the 
Aesopic tradition; cf. Haslam 1986, 153-154.
Vita G 101: HoWainq Se xpovouq sv ifi Sdpo) 5iaTpt\|/a<; 6 Aiaontoi; Kai noLkaw xiprov 
Kttxa^uoOelq f|PouLf|0q nspieLOeiv Tqv okoupsvqv, KUi ev xoig dKpoaxqpfotq bisLeyexo. 
xtpfipaxa 5e dpyupiKd XtiuPdvaiv Ttaaov xe xdipav TtepieLOwv 6 AiocoTioq syevexo [6e] ev 
BapuLdivi, ev fj ePaotLeuev AuKonpyoi;. embei^dpevoq 8e auxou xqv ipiXoaocplav peya?
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(npopA,fjn.axa cpiAxjoocpiai;, Vita G 102), who in turn ‘becomes an admirer of Ae­
sop’s character and intelligence’ {Vita G 101). Aesop then adopts a son, named 
Helios, in Babylon as ‘heir to his own wisdom’ (dx; 8id5oxov antou xfjg oocpiaq. 
Vita G 103). Before beginning to recite an extended and unrelated series of prov­
erbs to Helios, Aesop tells his adopted son to ‘preserve his words as a sacred trust’ 
(Kttl vuv onv (pnX,a^ov tootooi; (bq 7iapaKaxa0fiicr|v, Vita G 109). It is clear that 
this parakatatheke does not involve imparting an intangible kind of instinct - the 
‘quick wit’ (dyxivoiac;) or ‘readiness with words’ (enpeoiXoyoc;) that characterized 
the slave’s wisdom performances in Vita G 1-90. Rather, this type of knowledge 
is presented as something quasi-material, something Helios can possess and pre­
serve. Indeed, Aesop presents it to Helios as a body of wisdom in the form of a 
set of generalized precepts {Vita G 109-110):
tv oivo) pf) (pilokoya em5Eiicvup£vo<; TiaiSEiav dKatpox; ydp Kaxaoocpi^opE- 
vog KaxayEkao0f|(ri]. o^nxEpa pdSi^E xfjq yk(bxxri(;. xoi(; eo Jtpdxxoooi pf] cpOo- 
VEi dkkd ouy%aipE, xal peOe^ev; anxrav xfjt; Etwipa^iaq- 6 ydp (pOovwv dyvocov 
Ettoxov pkdTtxEi. Sonkoov ooo EmpEkon, pExa5i6oi)^ adxoig dq)’ ®v £xei<;, rva 
pf| {bq Kopiov povov EVxpETtcovxai OE, akka Kai (bq EOEpyEXTiv xipcboiv. Onpon 
KpdxEi. Edv XI 7tapT|KpaKd)(; pav0dvi](;, pf| aloxuvOfjc;- PeXxiov ydp ovi/ipaOfj 
pakkov f) dpaOfj KakEioOai. xfi yuvand oon Kpojcxon kuI dnoppfjxoov pq5£V 
adxfl Sfjkov xIOei- x6 ydp ytvoo, dvxiriakov 6v npoq xf)v onpPioKTiv okriv xfiv 
fipspav Ka0T|p^ oTtki^Exai, pqxav®li£vr| jtroq oon KopiEooEi.
When drinking wine do not discuss serious matters to show off your learning, 
for you will be tripped up in an off moment and get yourself laughed at. Be 
sharper than your tongue. Do not envy those who are successful, but rejoice 
with them, and you will share in their good fortune, for he who is jealous 
unwittingly harms himself. Take care of your slaves, and share what you have 
with them so that they may not only obey you as their master but also honor 
you as their benefactor. Rule your passions. If you learn a thing later than you 
should, do not be ashamed, for it is better to be called a late learner than a 
dolt. Keep your councils from your wife, and reveal no secrets to her, for 
womankind is a rival in married life, and she will sit all day plotting and 
scheming how to get you under control.
Ttapa Toi(; BaPuXxovioK; dvebeixOri, mors koI tov pamXEa epaorf|v auxoO yeveoBai xmv 
ijOcov Sia TO vouv ootov ex^iv, kuI STiotTiaev auxov etiI xfiq 5ioiKf|a6CO(;.
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This excerpt is part of a series of twenty uninterrupted and unrelated proverbs, 
amounting to the material inheritance (raipaKaTa0f|icr|) promised to Helios.
In keeping with the Life's representation of the free Aesop as the possessor of 
an established body of wisdom, more emphasis is placed upon the free Aesop’s 
status as a wise and learned man in Vita G 123 and 124. First, upon his return to 
Babylon after time spent in Egypt, Aesop is honored again with a statue and cel­
ebrated for his wisdom (kuI ETioirioev eopriiv peydA-riv 6 PaoiX£uq em xfj xou 
Aioranou oo(pia). Then, we are told that Aesop traveled to other cities before his 
fateful adventure in Delphi; in these unnamed cities Aesop ‘gave demonstrations 
of his wisdom and learning’ {Vita G 123). It seems noteworthy that, once Aesop 
is a freedman - that is, once he becomes an established teller of fables and is no 
longer the slave bricoleur — we no longer hear a word about his hideously ugly 
body, so prominent in his performances of wisdom in the first half of the work, 
and we do not hear about any beatings or other forms of physical violence. To be 
sure, there is plenty of danger:^^ we do read in these sections about two attempts 
to kill Aesop, and the second, at the hands of the Delphians, is successful.
5. Conclusion
In the fictional world of the Life of Aesop, the conditions and exigencies of en­
slavement and freedom give rise to two distinct modes of performance. By look­
ing closely at some key differences between Aesop’s enslaved and free perfor­
mances, I hope to have demonstrated that Aesop’s non-verbal communication and 
improvisatory wit are connected with his physical vulnerability as a slave in var­
ious ways, while his transformation into a kind of authority on human nature (cf. 
Vita G 101) is bound up with his manumission and with his subsequent mastery 
of a coherent, seemingly fixed body of wisdom. To put it another way, the slave’s 
body is replaced by the free author’s (putative) corpus.
The distinctions drawn between enslaved and free performances in the Life 
also reflect a dynamic tension that surfaces in virtually every phase of the fable’s 
history: namely, a tension between (1) a putatively oral, improvisational, and pre­
carious past, embedded in slavery, and (2) a written, fixed, and stable present, 
circulating in the material reality of the literary text. Rather than reading (2) as
Finkelpearl 2003, 45, observes that ‘moments of real danger’ occur in the Life when the 
fables take on a lasting, physical form. But Aesop faces serious physical danger from the 
beginning of the Life; it is more precise to note that the key difference is that the free Aesop 
faces existential threats but no longer physical ones.
5“ Vita G 104, 127.
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supplanting (1), and leading only to Aesop’s hubristic, fatal encounter with the 
Delphians, we ought to recognize how rich and productive the tension between 
the two has been for authors and fabulists throughout the history of the fable tra­
dition. The two visions of Aesopic storytelling I have been describing are mapped 
onto a life-cycle or ‘career’ in the Life of Aesop, with the result that the first vision 
- in slavery - is the fable genre’s ‘past’, while the second vision - in freedom - is 
the fable’s ‘present’ (or ‘future’). A strikingly similar idea can be found in the 
middle of the prologue to the central book of Phaedrus’ five books of Latin verse 
fables (Phaed. 3 Prol. 33-38):
Nunc, fabularum cur sit inventum genus, 
brevi docebo. Servitus obnoxia, 
quia quae volebat non audebat dicere, 
affectus proprios in fabellas transtulit, 
calumniamque fictis elusit iocis.
Ego illius pro semita feci viam
Now 1 will briefly explain why the fable genre was 
invented. The slave, being legally vulnerable, 
since he didn’t dare say openly what he wished to say, 
transferred his personal feelings into fables, 
and so avoided accusation with joking stories.
Where he cut a path I have built a broad road...
Phaedrus represents the pre-literate history of fable as something associated with 
slavery and something dangerous; but his literate product is something very dif­
ferent. Regardless of questions of historicity, Phaedrus presents himself as a free 
writer, one who wants his readers to think that he is writing down material that 
was originally oral and derived from slave experience.^^ Thus in Phaedrus, our 
earliest surviving collection of Aesopica, the fable is presented as a translation 
into Latin and a versification of material that was originally Greek, prose, and 
socio-politically low. But what Phaedrus created is analogous to all of our surviv­
ing Aesopica, including the Life of Aesop', as it survives in the literary record (in 
its many different manifestations), it is always in a state of having already under­
gone a process of becoming a literary product.
Champlin 2005.
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